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1 In this paper, I will show that there is a deep unity underlying Pierre-Yves Raccah’s views
in  the  theory  of  argumentation,  ethics,  moral  epistemology,  general  epistemology,
philosophy of science and cognitive psychology. A corollary of this position is that Raccah
has an inclusive philosophical system to offer, whose numerous specific standpoints are
consistently and harmonically intertwined. I will focus on the notion of “responsibility”,
and argue that the key role it plays in Raccah’s ethics and moral epistemology parallels
the crucial function it has in his general epistemology. I claim that the central thesis is
that people are fully morally responsible of the moral positions they hold, as well as of
the actions they perform in observance to these moral positions. The whole set of the
other  stances  he  takes  –  his  argumentative  conception  of  justifications,  his  moral
antifoundationalism and nonconventionalism, his view of human freedom – is required to
be consistent with that central thesis. When we consider Raccah’s general epistemology
and philosophy of science, however, we discover that the situation is very similar: just as
Raccah’s moral epistemology is aimed at rejecting the claim that we may not be morally
responsible of embracing the particular moral position we embrace, his epistemology and
philosophy of  science  are  aimed at  rejecting  the  claim that  we may not  be  morally
responsible of embracing the particular description of the world we embrace. Mutatis
mutandis, the same stances are taken in the descriptive as in the prescriptive realm under
the same rational pressures and dependently to the same philosophical reasons. I explain
in  what  sense  Raccah’s  antifoundationalist  position  about  descriptive  argumentation
corresponds  to  his  antifoundationalist  position  about  normative  reasoning,  and  I
conclude  by  showing  that  there  is  no  incoherence  –  no idealist  drift,  and  even  no
detachment from empiricism – in embracing Raccah’s  idea that  we are fully morally
responsible of all the empirical statements we accept as true.
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1. Rejecting moral foundationalism
2 I first met Pierre-Yves Raccah in 1994, and I believe that one of the cornerstones of his
philosophy is also one of my first indelible memories of him. We immediately started
using to spend hours discussing any claim just for fun – what we regularly keep doing.
One night,  some of us made a moral  claim. Someone else attacked it.  The claim was
repeatedly charged and defended, and the burden of proof shifted on several claims that
we happened to use as premises, until he said: « You cannot go further. At the end of any
discussion of this sort you will always arrive to “J’aime” or “Je n’aime pas”». His thesis
deeply impressed me:
The  J’Aime  /  N’Aime  Pas  Thesis:  at  the  very  beginning  of  every  prescriptive
argumentation, what we ultimately find is “J’aime” (“I love it”) or “Je n’aime pas”
(“I do not love it”)1.
3 This is perhaps the most radical way of formulating an antifoundationalist position about
normative reasoning – unless you think that you can found a moral claim on a judgement
of taste that is commonly exhibited as the typical subjective non-universal judgement. In
fact even in Kant, while “X is beautiful” is a subjective, universal judgement of taste, “I
like  X” or  “I  love  X” are  just  subjective,  non-universal  ones:  they do not  claim any
validity; we cannot be said to think of them being universal; they feature no normative
constraint2.  And  one  may  presume  that  we  cannot  found normative  reasoning  on
subjective non-universal judgements of taste.
4 But how is the whole story supposed to go? We may reconstruct it by saying that, in our
effort  to argumentatively justify a  prescriptive (e.g.,  a  moral)  statement,  we must  of
course  make  use  of  further  prescriptive  statements  as  premises.  As  Hume  famously
claimed, in fact, we cannot go from an “is” to an “ought” – that is, there is no argument
that has only descriptive premises, has a prescriptive conclusion, and is valid3. Hence the
problem  of  argumentatively  supporting  one  normative  statement  –  the  original
conclusion  –  turns  into  the  problem  of  argumentatively  supporting  some  further
normative statements – the premises. What Raccah was saying is that in the normative
field the justificative procedures have no end, and our quest for a stable foundation of a
prescriptive statement is doomed to frustration. The only way of stopping the infinite
regress is renouncing the need for justification somewhere by allowing an unjustified
premise.
5 Of course this situation is the same we are in when we look for an inferential justification
of descriptive premises in empirical science. We need to consider as true at least some
empirical premises in order to inferentially justify any statement, and this need starts an
infinite regress as well. Jacob Friedrich Fries (1807) famously established that there are
only three options here, and none seems acceptable: infinite regress, dogmatism, and
psychologism.  150  years  later,  Albert  (1968)  reaffirmed  Fries’s  trilemma  by  slightly
modifying  it  –  he  named  it  “Münchhausen’s  trilemma”,  unified  dogmatism  and
psychologism, and added circularity as the third horn.  So we find this tri-  or maybe
quadri-lemma again in Raccah’s account of prescriptive argumentation, in one pack with
Raccah’s solution: we must drop our concern for foundational justifications  and accept
that our justifications are not founded at all – since they necessarily finally depend on our
“J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s. Obviously Raccah believes that “J’aime” and “Je n’aime
pas”, when used as the final premises of a justificative argumentation, should not be
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taken as dogmas or psychological foundations. He rather thinks that, by making explicit
that  our  justifications  of  our  prescriptive  positions  are  hung  on  our  unjustifiable,
subjective, non-universal and maybe non-rational judgements of taste, we make it clear
that our prescriptive positions are not something we are not responsible of.
6 I claim that the notion of responsibility is one of the most crucial – if not the most crucial –
in  Raccah’s  overall  philosophy.  Thus  it  is  important  to  clarify  what  is  the  relation
between his moral antifoundationalism and the importance he assigns to responsibility in
ethics and even in epistemology.
7 Suppose for a moment that moral positions could be argumentatively justified moving
from ultimately non-argumentatively justified prescriptive premises. We do not have to
specify here how it is that these premises happen to be non-argumentatively justified: it
might be that they are self-evidently correct (psychologism), or we are accepting them as
non-debatable (dogmatism), or they are acknowledged as having any altogether different
status.  What  happens  is  that  we  are  now  morally  justified  in  embracing  our  moral
positions  as  a  consequence  of  our  being  morally  justified  in  embracing  whatever  is
argumentatively  justified  moving  from  whatever  non-argumentatively  justified
prescriptive premises. However, since we are evidently not morally responsible for what
is  completely  independent  from  us,  we are  not  morally  responsible  for  the  moral
positions we are morally justified to hold. In fact, we are not morally responsible of the
fact  that  our  moral  positions  can  be  argumentatively  justified  moving  from certain
premises  –  nor  are  we morally  responsible  of  the fact  that  these  premises  are  non-
argumentatively justified premises. It turns out that we can be perfectly morally justified
in embracing certain moral positions without being morally responsible of embracing
them.
8 This conclusion would seem absurd to many; I am sure it has appeared intolerable to
Raccah, and that his moral antifoundationalism should be viewed as a move aimed at
avoiding it. Raccah wants to conclude that we are fully responsible of what moral positions
we hold – as well as of what we intentionally do as a consequence of our embracing
certain  moral  positions  rather  than  others.  Moral  foundationalism  seems,  on  the
contrary, a theoretical view entailing that we are not morally responsible for what moral
positions turn out to be correct. Moral foundationalism makes people acting accordingly
to well-founded moral statements not morally responsible of how they act.
9 In a Kantian spirit one could object that, no matter that a moral position is well-founded,
we are still morally responsible of embracing it when we embrace it, in as much as we are
free not to embrace it. The answer is that, if moral positions admit foundations, it could be
easily argued that we are not really free to embrace the most robustly founded moral
position we actually embrace4. Let us consider two separate steps in which our embracing
the most robustly founded moral position could reasonably take place:
Step 1. We commit to embrace whatever moral position will turn out to be the most
robustly founded one;
Step 2. We actually embrace moral position M as a consequence of our identifying M
as the most robustly founded moral position.
10 The point is that both steps can be said to lack the kind of freedom that is necessary for
moral responsibility to obtain. In fact, taking Step 1 seems required by reason, in the
sense  that  we  appear  not  free  to  embrace  an ill-founded (or,  a  non-founded)  moral
position rather than the most robustly founded one – just like as we are not free to
believe  a  descriptive  proposition which is  contradicted by  evidence  rather  than one
Epistemology and Responsibility
Corela, HS-19 | 2016
3
which  is  supported  by  evidence.  In  other  words,  as  long  as  moral  positions  admit
foundations consisting in argumentative justifications moving from non-argumentatively
justified prescriptive premises, as sketched above, we simply seem to lack freedom to
resist the rational pressures of these foundations with regards to the choice of the moral
positions we will explicitly hold. The right kind of freedom seems also absent in Step 2,
where we appear as forced to embrace the particular moral position M that satisfies the
description of being the most robustly founded one. Thus, if M turned out to entail that –
say – gratuitously causing the sufferance of animals is morally preferable to omitting to
do so, we would be obliged to embrace M as a consequence of Step 1 and of M’s satisfying
the  relevant  description,  no  matter  that  many  of  us  happen  to  dislike  causing  the
suffering  of  living  creatures.  As  a  result,  sadistic  individuals  could  start  procuring
sufferance to animals without being morally responsible of it.  They could just defend
themselves saying that:
1. It is M that asks us to cause the suffering of animals.
So,
2. we only would be morally responsible of causing the suffering of animals if we
were morally responsible of embracing M.
But
3. we are not morally responsible of what we are not free to avoid;
and since (if moral foundationalism holds)
4. we are not free to escape from Step 1,
and
5. we are not free to escape from Step 2,
then
6. we are not free to abstain from embracing M.
As a result of 3. and 6.,
7. we are not morally responsible of embracing M.
And, as a result of 2. and 7.,
8. we are not morally responsible of causing the suffering of animals.
11 On my view, Raccah’s philosophy is importantly characterized by the need to reject 8. He
would admit 1., 2. and 3. He also would admit that 4. and 5. entail 6.; 3. and 6. entail 7.; and
2. and 7. entail 8. His strategy to reject 8. consists in rejecting both 4. and 5. by rejecting
moral foundationalism.
 
2. How free are we?
12 I think that the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis is sufficient for guaranteeing the rejection of
moral  foundationalism.  However,  the  rejection  of  moral  foundationalism  is  only
necessary in Raccah’s philosophy in order to reject 8. and assuring that we are morally
responsible  of  the moral  positions  we hold,  as  well  as  of  the actions we perform in
observance to these moral positions. So the real question is whether the J’Aime / N’Aime
Pas  Thesis  is  sufficient  for  assuring these important  conclusions.  I  am afraid that  we
cannot take it for granted that it is. And the main reason is this: what we really must
provide is a philosophical basis for rejecting 6. What the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis offers is
just the discard of a proper subset of all circumstances in which 6. can be true – that is,
the subset of those circumstances in which 6. is true because moral foundationalism holds.
However, 6. can also be true if moral foundationalism does not hold. We have no prima
facie reason to think that the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis allows us to reject 6. also under all
circumstances in which moral foundationalism does not hold.
Epistemology and Responsibility
Corela, HS-19 | 2016
4
13 Moreover, we have some prima facie reasons to suspect that the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis
actually confirms 6. The argument goes like this:
Suppose that moral foundationalism is false. Suppose that the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas
Thesis holds,  and that 9.  we just happen to embrace M because we have a good
argumentative  justification  of  M  moving  from  our  strongest,  least  dispensable
“J’aime” and “Je n’aime pas”.
In other words, we embrace M rather than any other moral position because the
“J’aime”s  and  “Je  n’aime  pas”s  serving  as  premises  of  our  M-supporting
argumentations  appear  to  us  as stronger  and  less  dispensable  than  any  other
“J’aime” and “Je n’aime pas” supporting any other moral position different from M.
Yet it is true that
10. we are not free to avoid liking what we intensely like and disliking what we
intensely dislike,what in turn entails that
11. we are not free to avoid having the particular strongest and least dispensable
“J’aime” and “Je n’aime pas” that we have.
As a consequence of 9. and 11.,
6. we are not free to abstain from embracing M.
What, as we know, also entails 7. and 8 (with the help of, respectively, 3. and 2.,
whose truth is not under discussion).
14 What is wrong in this argument? I think that this is a very compelling one, and that it
puts  at  risk  the  usefulness  of  the  J’Aime  /  N’Aime  Pas  Thesis.  No  doubt  that  a
conventionalist alternative to the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis would be a good solution to
solve the problem. What we need is some guarantee that we are morally responsible of
using certain prescriptive statements as the premises of the justifications of our moral
positions. By making the individuation of the premises a free act, conventionalism easily
achieves this result. 
15 Yet conventionalism has the negative aspect of making moral positions the result of an
arbitrary,  “coldly”  deliberative  act.  First  of  all,  if  we  freely  choose  our  prescriptive
premises without being pressed by any freedom-threatening reason, it seems that we
literally have no reason for choosing the particular premises we choose rather than any
other.  Having  no  reason  supporting  one’s  choice  means  choosing non-reasonably:
therefore, we could be said to non-reasonably hold each moral position we happen to
hold.  Secondly,  our  moral  positions  are  not  just  prescriptive  statements  we “coldly”
subscribe  to.  Each  moral  statement  expresses  a  moral  sentiment,  where  a  moral
sentiment is  a disposition whose occurrent manifestations are moral  emotions (Prinz
2007).  This  entails  that  a  moral  statement  actually  expresses  both  a  standing  moral
sentiment  and  its  occurrent  moral  emotional  manifestation.  For  example,  moral
indignation is a moral emotion, and “Killing is wrong” may express the moral emotion
also expressible as: “Killing: what a moral indignation I feel!”. If I am not feeling this
emotion at the time I am uttering the sentence, however, the statement still expresses
the moral  sentiment consisting,  among other things,  in my disposition to feel  moral
indignation if someone kills. Now, conventionalism seems to neglect the fact that moral
emotions and moral sentiments are very “hot” mental items, and that the very fact that
we happen to feel them enters non-conventionally in our choice of certain moral premises
rather than others. This is also part of the story why embracing a moral position has a
constitutive – though not insurmountable – motivational aspect. No doubt that, however,
moral emotions and moral sentiments are once again something that we do not seem to
be free of avoiding. Thus we may suspect to be caught in a dilemma: whether we account
for our freedom to choose our moral premises – what rescues moral responsibility at the
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price of neglecting the emotional, sentimental and motivational aspects of morality and
maybe also making all our moral positions non-reasonable – or we account for the non-
arbitrariness of the moral premises by connecting them to our emotional life and finally
to our personality – what saves a large part of our intuitions about morality at the price
of threatening moral responsibility.
16 My  solution  to  escape  this  dilemma  is  adopting  a  form  of  quasi-conventionalism
consisting in choosing to use as prescriptive premises those prescriptive statements that
express  moral  sentiments  which  we  experience  with  an  intensity  high  enough  for
temporarily  considering  them  universal  and  non-debatable.  In  substance,  the  moral
sentiment expressed by a basic prescriptive statement must appear so undeniable as to
render temporarily superfluous any line of argument supporting that statement. I have
called this approach “Popperian” because it develops for prescriptive premises the same
strategy  that  Popper  (1934)  proposed  for  individuating  basic  statements  in  science
(Bacchini 2015). Yet my attention is mainly focused onto making it rational – in the sense
of intersubjectively approvable – to stop at some unjustified prescriptive statements and use
them as premises. This is why I propose that we take the intensity of a moral sentiment,
and of a moral emotion, as a temporary clue to its universality and non-debatableness.
17 I think that Raccah’s approach is different. His J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis is not meant to be
consistent with my idea that we choose those prescriptive premises that we presume
express universal and non-debatable moral sentiments. Of course I take the intensity at
which we personally experience the moral sentiment as the only evidence we must use to
infer its universality and non-debatableness – so my position is not fully conventionalist
and cannot be easily accused to collapse into a form of tactical opportunism. Yet my
proposal takes final argumentative moral agreement as an important goal. Neither the
J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis nor Raccah’s general conception of argumentation do so.
18 So what is Raccah’s solution to the dilemma? His orientation is towards rejecting – or at
least importantly weakening – 10. and therefore 11. In a certain measure, according to
him we can choose what we like and dislike. Those who know Raccah can say how many
times he insists that you can stop liking or disliking something – or equivalently, you can
start doing so – if you just want to. This attitude is part of his most general conception of
human freedom as a feature that is much more present in our actions (and omissions5)
than  what  is  usually  acknowledged.  Raccah  claims  that  we  are  literally  free  also  in
situations in which we would routinely say that we are not. Take, for instance, the case in
which a robber threatens me to kill my son if I do not give him the combination of the
strongbox. Obviously I give him the combination; and later I describe what happened by
saying that “I had no choice”, or, that “I wasn’t free not to give him the combination”.
Raccah thinks that these reconstructions are manifestly false6. In fact I was completely
free not to obey the robber. I was free to opt for the possible worlds in which I do not
obey the robber and risk that my son be killed by him. But I did not want these possible
worlds to become actual. And I freely chose the alternative possible worlds in which I
obey the robber. Under all the main philosophical accounts of human freedom7, I was
fully free. The only situations in which I am really unfree are those in which I undergo
physical coercion: but since these are also situations in which I don’t act – and rather I am
acted – Raccah can argue that whenever we act, we are free to act8.
19 This general  thesis,  which I  call  the Extra-Freedom Thesis,  entails  that we are morally
responsible in much more occasions than we admit we are – I call the latest claim the
Extra-Responsibility  Thesis.  It  is  simple to notice that  the Extra-Responsibility  Thesis just
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follows from the conjunction of the Extra-Freedom Thesis and the claim that we are morally
responsible of whatever (i) is partly caused by our freely acting in a certain way, and (ii)
we are able to know is partly caused by our acting in that way9 (or, some other adequate
epistemic requirement).  I  take the Extra-Responsibility  Thesis to have a central  role in
Raccah’s  philosophy  –  impacting  not  just  his  ethical  but  also  his  epistemological
positions, as I will show in the next section.
20 As a consequence of the Extra-Responsibility Thesis, and contrary to popular opinion, we
may be morally responsible of some tastes and preferences we have. And this would be
only possible if, as a consequence of the Extra-Freedom Thesis,  and contrary to popular
opinion,  we may be  free  to  have  those  tastes  and preferences.  But  how can Raccah
maintain  that  we  may  be  free  to  choose  our  tastes  and  preferences?  At  a  first
approximation, his answer is that we evidently are not forced to have all the preferences
we happen to have – and, conversely, we are not forced to have not all the preferences we
happen to have not. Suppose, for example, that you have to hire a new worker in your
company.  You discover to have a preference for hiring a white person.  As soon you
discover to have this preference, however, you also start wanting to stop having it. And
what you do is precisely stopping having the preference: you successfully choose the new
employee without being influenced by this preference because you stopped having it.
21 Of course it is also possible that you continue having the preference and you successfully
try to limit its influence on your decision. But what is claimed here is that it is also
possible that you successfully altogether eliminate the preference from the set of the
preferences you have. In as much as this is possible, it is true that we can at least partially
reject 10. and 11.
22 Raccah’s view of human psychology is indeed highly hierarchical. He thinks that it is a
very remarkable fact about our psychological architecture that we can recursively build
up representations about representations. What seems crucial to reject 10. and 11 is our
mental  capacity  to  develop  higher-order  preferences  about  lower-order  preferences,
together  with  the  fact  that  higher-order  preferences  are  sometimes  effective  in
modifying the set of lower-order preferences that we have. Consider, for example, Raccah
(2004),  where  the  personality  of  a  particular  individual  is  represented  as  a  specific
network  of  positive  and  negative  commitments  to  ordinary  judgments  of  taste.  He
maintains that we happen to have higher-order preferences about how our personality
may  change  –  for  example,  we  typically  may  desire  to  have  a  personality  whose
representation is a more compact and connected network of lower-order preferences. He
also believes that we are free to modify the network according to these higher-order
preferences. In particular, we are free to drop a lower-order preference we no longer like
to have because of its being scarcely integrated with the others. Or, we are free to create
new lower-order preferences in order to connect an isolated lower-order preference to a
more integrated group of them10.
23 What Raccah needs for rejecting 10. and 11. is nothing but claiming that:
a. Our mental life includes not only representations but also metarepresentations;
b. Some metarepresentations we have are higher-order preferences that a lower-
order preference we have is removed from the set of our preferences – or, that a
lower-order preference we do not have is added;
c. A number of metarepresentations described in b. are effective.
24 Claims a. and b. seem not problematic, and I will assume them to be true. On the other
hand,  c.  can  be  contested.  Yet  I  think  that  it  is  not  difficult  to  bring  psychological
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evidence supporting it. We do not have to forget that a metarepresentation of the kind
described in b. can result to be effective also in virtue of its successfully generating some
effective volitions to change one’s behaviour in such ways that facilitate the content of
the  original  metarepresentation  to  become  true.  For  example,  my  higher-order
preference for  stopping disliking dogs may turn out to be successful  in virtue of  its
successfully generating my effective volition to start spending my time with the lovely
dog of my best friend.
25 This solution to the dilemma sketched above can be said to be Frankfurtian, of course,
because Harry Frankfurt (1971) first famously distinguished between our freedom to act
accordingly to whatever are our first-order desires (which he called ‘freedom of action’)
and our freedom to act accordingly to those first-order desires determined accordingly to
our second-order desires (which he called ‘freedom of the will’). Frankfurt said that:
A person who is free to do what he wants to do may yet not be in a position to have
the will  he wants. Suppose, however, that he enjoys both freedom of action and
freedom of the will. Then he is not only free to do what he wants to do; he is also
free to want what he wants to want. It seems to me that he has, in that case, all the
freedom it is possible to desire or conceive. There are other good things in life, and
he may not possess some of them. But there is nothing in the way of freedom that
he lacks. (Frankfurt 1971: 17)
26 The problem, for our Frankfurtian Raccah, is that there is a possibly lethal objection to
his move. The objection is this. Let us assume that we can choose our “J’aime”s and “Je
n’aime pas”s accordingly to our higher-order preferences about our “J’aime”s and “Je
n’aime  pas”s.  These  higher-order  preferences  can  be  also  described  as  higher-order
“J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s serving as the real final premises in the justifications of
our moral positions. Now, do we choose to have them? If we do not choose to have them,
as it seems, both 10. and 11. turn out to be true, and 6., 7. and 8. also turn out to be true.
In  other  words,  there  is  no  real  progress  from a  situation  in  which  our  first-order
“J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s are not freely chosen, to a situation in which our higher-
order “J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s are not freely chosen – because in both cases we are
not free to abstain from embracing M. The same objection, of course, can be directed to
Frankfurt: if my second-order volitions are not the second-order volitions I want to have,
I am not free to have them; this means that I am choosing freely neither my first-order
volitions (which I determine accordingly to my second-order volitions) nor my actions
(which I determine accordingly to my first-order volitions).
27 I think that Raccah has two good answers to give here. The first answer is that it is not
necessary that the “J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s we use as unjustified premises in the
justifications  of  our  moral  positions  be  the  highest-order  metapreferences  we  have
ascended  to.  Suppose  the  highest-order  metapreference  you  have  arrived  to  is  the
preference that you prefer to prefer to avoid make animals suffer. Yet one of the final
unjustified  prescriptive  premises  of  the  argumentative  justifications  of  our  moral
positions can be “Je n’aime pas make animals suffer”, or, “J’aime preferring to avoid make
animals suffer”. Clearly these “J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s are lower-order with regards
to the highest-order metapreference you have arrived to – what means that they have
freely been chosen.
28 In  some sense,  this  answer  parallels  an analogous  defence  that  one  could  supply  to
Frankfurt’s position. In fact, in the same spirit one could defend Frankfurt by saying that
an action is free just as long as the person acts accordingly to her will – no matter that
the will is free; and, a person’s will is free just as long as it is determined accordingly to
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her second-order desires – no matter that these second-order desires are determined
accordingly to higher-order desires. On this view, lack of freedom is not inherited down
through representational levels.
29 The  second  answer  is  that  there  is  in  principle  no  limit  to  the  recursive  human
psychological  capacity  to  form  higher-order  metarepresentations.  We  can  form
metarepresentations of the third order, the fourth order, and so on. This means that we
always have the possibility to choose whatever level of desires, preferences, tastes and
volitions we want. Although we practically must stop at some level, it is never true that
we have to stop at that level. And, contrary to Frankfurt, this truly seems “all the freedom
it is possible to desire or conceive”. On this line of reasoning, the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis
still  holds. Yet we can affirm that we are never forced to adopt any particular set of
prescriptive preferences – what is sufficient for making us morally responsible of whatever
are the “J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s we use as unjustified premises in the justifications
of our moral positions.  At least,  we are morally responsible of having accepted them
without bringing our control up to the higher level – what we always are free to do.
30 As I see it, Raccah can successfully argue that the “J’aime”s and “Je n’aime pas”s we use as
unjustified premises in our justifications are constitutive of that part of our personality
we have the power to shape and we bring the moral responsibility of. If I use a certain
“J’aime” as a premise in my argumentative justifications, not only I have it: I also freely
decide to acknowledge it the status of a premise in my argumentative justifications – what
is a completely different thing, and what seems to be a free act of mine which I am fully
responsible of. I can easily abstain from acknowledging that preference such status, no
matter that I have the preference. This is clearly a respect under which Raccah’s position
is more easily defendable than Frankfurt’s.
31 This concludes my analysis of how, in Raccah’s philosophy, an argumentative conception
of  justifications,  the  J’Aime  /  N’Aime  Pas  Thesis,  moral  antifoundationalism and moral
nonconventionalism  meet  both  the  requirement  that  our  moral  premises  be  non-
arbitrary and connected to our emotional life and personality, and the requirement that
we can be said fully morally responsible of the moral positions we hold.
 
3. Epistemology
32 Just as Raccah’s moral epistemology is aimed at rejecting the thesis that we may not be
morally responsible of embracing the particular moral position we embrace, his general
epistemology is aimed at rejecting the thesis that we may not be morally responsible of
embracing the particular description of the world we embrace.
33 Raccah’s  general  epistemology  parallels  his  view  of  moral epistemology.  We  are  fully
morally responsible of the descriptive statements we embrace, just as we are fully morally
responsible of the prescriptive statements we embrace. Not only are we not forced to
accept any scientific theory as true, but also we are not forced to accept any empirical
statement as true. The Extra-Freedom Thesis and the Extra-Responsibility Thesis apply here.
As a consequence of this account of human knowledge, “scientists and divulgators have a
central responsibility in the way the world we live in is”11: they freely choose what is the
true description of the world, and cannot be exempted from their responsibility on the
grounds that what is true is independent of them.
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34 Let us examine how these claims find a specific support in Raccah’s philosophy. First of
all,  he maintains – like Duhem, Quine and many other philosophers of science – that
scientific theories are constitutively underdetermined by empirical evidence. This is to
say that there is no valid inference from empirical statements to scientific theories: many
different and incompatible theories are consistent with the set of empirical statements
accepted as true, whatever their number and accuracy.
35 But what about the idea of founding scientific theories in the way we (try to) found moral
positions  –  that  is,  by  argumentatively  justifying  them  moving  from  those  justified 
descriptive premises that empirical statements accepted as true after careful consideration
can be supposed to be? If we could be successful in this attempt, we would be able to say
that we are not responsible of the scientific theories we embrace (the equivalent of claim
7.),  no  matter  that  an  “argumentative  justification”  is  an  invalid  inference.  Note,
however, that this is exactly the situation described by Fries (1807) and Albert (1968): the
only options seem to be infinite regress, dogmatism, psychologism or circularity.
36 Mutatis mutandis, in fact, Raccah’s moves are the same as in the moral field. He asks what
could make any descriptive statement a justified descriptive premise. Arguably the answer
is that an empirical statement that is accepted as true after careful consideration is the
true  description  of  one  or  more  facts:  an  obtaining  state  of  affairs,  apparently
independent of us. But what if someone questions our justification by saying that one of
our descriptive premises is not the true description of a fact? We presumably should try
to  justify  the  statement  that  “the  premise  called  into  question  actually  is the  true
description of a fact” moving from more robustly founded premises.  These premises,
however, would be at best other empirical statements about which the same question
could be raised. « At the end of any discussion of this sort – Raccah can repeat – you will
always arrive to “J’aime” or “Je n’aime pas”.» What kind of “J’aime” or “Je n’aime pas”,
this time? Well, this kind: “I love / want to consider descriptive statement d as a true
description of a fact” and “I do not love / want to consider descriptive statement d as a
true description of one or more facts”. So there is an equivalent to The J’Aime / N’Aime Pas
Thesis for the descriptive domain after all:
The equivalent to the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas Thesis for the descriptive domain: at the
very beginning of  every descriptive argumentation12,  what we ultimately find is
“J’aime” (“I love / want to consider descriptive statement d as a true description of
one or more facts”) or “Je n’aime pas” (“I do not love / want to consider descriptive
statement d as a true description of one or more facts”).
37 And – like for the moral domain – Raccah adds that we are basically free to choose our
“J’aime”s  or  “Je  n’aime pas”s.  His  conclusion is  that  we are  fully  responsible  of  the
descriptive  statements  we  embrace  as  true.  We  are  morally  responsible  of  both  the
scientific theories, and of the empirical statements we accept as true.
38 Of course the two latter claims are not equivalent at all. In fact many philosophers, while
admitting that accepted scientific theories must somehow be “chosen” as an effect of
their being underdetermined by evidence, would maintain that facts are imposed to us by
the world, and that empirical statements accepted as true after careful consideration –
since they (hopefully) just are true descriptions of facts – are also imposed to us by the
world. The argument seems to go like this:
12. An empirical statement that is accepted as true after careful consideration is a
descriptive statement that is a true description of one or more facts. But
13. facts are imposed to us by the world, so we should also concede that
14. empirical statements accepted as true after careful consideration are imposed to
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us by the world. Therefore
15.  we are  not  free  to  choose  the  empirical  statements  we accept as  true  after
careful consideration; and
16. we are not morally responsible of the empirical statements we accept as true
after careful consideration.
39 What is Raccah’s strategy to rebut this argument? According to Raccah, there are two
very different concepts of a fact that we may have in mind. Let us call the things they are
a concept  of,  respectively,  “fact1” and “fact2”.  A fact1  is  an obtaining state of  affairs
independent of us and distinct from any description of it. 13. is true of facts1, if any. But
we cannot know anything about facts1, not even whether they exist or not, because we
have no cognitive access to them. As Raccah clearly asserts:
We cannot know what the “essential features” of the world are, principally because
we could not be in the position to exhibit “essential features” of the world which
our cognitive system does not handle: the picture our cognitive apparatus can give
us of the world is only a picture of what we can grasp about it... (Raccah 2005a: 9)
40 Since we have no cognitive access to facts1,  we cannot ever know whether a specific
descriptive statement is a true description of a fact1 or not. In other words, if we assume
facts=facts1,  we  can  never  know  whether  a  specific  descriptive  statement  satisfies
requirement 12. or not. Thus, we should accept as true no empirical statement, and no
accepted-as-true  empirical  statement  should  exist.  Since  we  accept  as  true  a  lot  of
empirical statements, however, we must conclude that they are not the kind of empirical
statements  satisfying  requirement  12.  under  the  condition  facts=facts1.  Therefore,  if
facts=facts1, we cannot conclude 14., 15. and 16.
41 Let us now turn to the concept of “fact2”. Facts2 are part of “the picture our sensorial and
cognitive apparatus can give us of the world”, and this is why we do have a cognitive
access to them. But since they are part of that picture,  they have a representational
nature, and this is why they are not identical to facts1, which are characterised as being
“distinct from any representation of them”. According to Raccah’s empiricist position,
the picture of  the world we can produce is  only made out of  our “raw perceptions”
(Raccah  2005b:  8)  (the  empirical  raw  materials)  via  unconscious  and  conscious
interpretations of them. Facts2 are nothing but the products of our interpreting in certain
particular ways our sensorial and perceptual experiences. Arguably we produce facts2 by
interpreting our sensorial and perceptual experiences as if they were giving us cognitive
access  to  facts1 –  which is  not  actually  the  case,  as  previously  explained
13.  Facts2 are
constructed by the subject;  when Raccah talks about “the construction of  observable
facts”, he is referring to what I am calling “facts2”:
The role  of  the  observer  in  the  construction  of  the  observable  facts  cannot  be
considered as a mere ‘deformation’ of a reality which would be external to her /
him, but rather, as a construction of an accessible reality. The externalisation of
that  accessible  reality  constructed  by  the  observer  can  only  be  posterior  to  its
construction. This externalisation is the result of a social and cognitive process.
(Raccah 2007: 1088)
42 Although we may sometimes speak of “directly observable facts”, we must remember that
no fact is directly observable, and that we gain cognitive access to facts2 just because we
construct them moving from the only empirical raw materials we have available, i.e. our
sensorial and perceptual experiences:
Technically, nothing is really directly observable, since we must interpret what our
senses grasp; however, some entities are more indirectly observable than others:
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for instance, the mass of a block is observable only through a device which one
must trust in order to assess it, while the existence of the block need not such an
external  device  in  order  to  be  assessed.  In  the  second  case  (when  no  external
artificial device is needed), it is a normal language use to speak of ‘direct observation’,
though, we insist, it is only a less indirect observation. (Raccah 2007: 1087)
43 Facts2 are the result of a certain number of interpretative acts.  Being the result of a
certain number of interpretative acts is constitutive of facts2, since facts2 would not be
what they are if they were not the result of that certain number of interpretative acts.
Our interpretative acts, however, are not imposed by the world. No doubt that we are free
to interpret our sensorial and perceptual experiences in many different ways, and some
of them do not end in the construction of facts2 (for example, we are free to interpret our
sensorial and perceptual experiences as if they were experienced in a dream, or as if they
were caused by a Cartesian demon, and so on14).  Moreover, also in case we choose to
interpret our sensorial and perceptual experiences as to produce facts2, there seem to be
many different and incompatible ways to do it. We can express this idea by saying that
evidence is underdetermined by sensorial and perceptual experiences, just as scientific
theories are underdetermined by evidence. Thus, if facts=facts2, 13. must be rejected, and
we cannot conclude 14., 15. and 16.
44 Since both under the case in which facts=facts1 and under the case in which facts=facts2
we cannot conclude 14., 15. and 16., it seems that the argument can be rejected. So Raccah
has  no  difficulty  in  maintaining  that  we  are  morally  responsible  of  the  empirical
statements we accept as true. In short, his position can be summed up like this: empirical
statements  would be  imposed by  the  world  if  their  truth-maker  were  facts1;  but  no
empirical statement can be said to be true of facts1; empirical statements can be at best
said to be true of facts2, and facts2 are not imposed by the world. Since we are free to
make choices about what facts2 we construct, we necessarily are also free to make choices
about what empirical statements we accept as true. Therefore we are morally responsible
both of the facts2 we construct, and of the empirical statements we accept as true of
them.
45 Two specifications are in order. Firstly, once we have fixed facts2, naturally we are no
longer free to choose the empirical  statements we accept as true of  them, since what
empirical statements are true of facts2 is the consequence of facts2 and semantic rules.
Yet Raccah’s point is that, in our being free to interpret our sensorial and perceptual
experiences as to produce different sets of facts2, we are ipso facto free of making true
different  sets  of  empirical  statements.  Secondly,  to  say  that  facts2 –  and  empirical
statements true of them – are not imposed by the world, does not amount to say that the
world has no role in determining them. No doubt that the world has a direct causal role in
producing  our  sensorial  and  perceptual  experiences.  Yet  these  experiences  are  the
consequences  of  the  world  and of  our  sensorial  and perceptual  apparatus;  and,  it  is
impossible for us to distinguish the one causal role from the other (what is equivalent to
say  that  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  identify  facts1).  Moreover,  facts2 –  and  empirical
statements  true  of  them –  are  underdetermined  by  our  sensorial  and  perceptual
experiences, and we can just get to facts2 – and to empirical statements true of them –
through our interpreting the sensorial and perceptual experiences we have. Thus facts2
are not arbitrary nor independent of the world (in fact they would be different were the
world different from what it is) while being, at the same time, constructed by us. This is
what Raccah remarks when he writes:
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Acknowledging that our beliefs about the existence of what we perceive cannot be
invoked as a proof of its existence is something different from believing that those
beliefs are false.
Acknowledging that the way we perceive the world is influenced by our theoretical
biases is something different from believing that the world plays no role in the way we
perceive it.
Understanding that there is no way for us to know the distance between how we
represent the world and how it really is is  something different from believing that
there is no real fact in the world, and does not prevent from believing that science
does help shortening the distance. (Raccah 2005b: 12-13)15
46 Supposing facts1 to be such-and-such, and even supposing them to exist, is irrational.
Raccah confesses to have himself this belief, but he demands that “no scientific method
or conception can be based on it” (Raccah 2007: 1086). On the contrary, interpreting our
sensorial  and  perceptual  experiences  as  to  provide  certain  facts2,  and  accordingly
accepting certain empirical statements as true of these facts2, is not irrational. This is the
only thing we can do in order to increase our knowledge of the world.  However,  we
should not confuse facts2 and facts1.  Facts2 are (partly) chosen by us;  we are morally
responsible of accepting them (while we would not be responsible of accepting facts1 if we
could have cognitive access to them).
47 On my view of Raccah’s overall philosophy, the concept of moral responsibility plays a
major role in his epistemology, theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, just as it
played one in his moral epistemology and ethics. Scientists cannot ever say that “it is not
their fault” that a certain fact holds, or that a certain empirical statement is true. We are
morally responsible of the empirical statements we hold as true, and appeal to empirical
truth is not sufficient to exempt us from this responsibility – since even observational
statements  are  not  imposed  by  the  world.  Thus  Raccah  can  claim  that  “scientific
neutrality is irresponsible and false” (Raccah 2005b: 27), and that no scientific theory can
be  argumentatively  justified  moving  from  non-argumentatively  justified  descriptive
premises.  In  fact,  there  is  no  non-argumentatively  justified  descriptive  statement.
Science, like morality, cannot be founded – and scientists are morally responsible of the
particular picture of the world they suggest us to adopt, as well as of the facts, entities
and properties they encourage us to put into it. Even in science, justification cannot be
but argumentative justification in the end, and the equivalent to the J’Aime / N’Aime Pas
Thesis for the descriptive domain holds: the real final premises necessarily are of the kind
“J’aime” (“I love / want to consider descriptive statement d as a true description of one or
more facts”) or “Je n’aime pas” (“I do not love / want to consider descriptive statement d
as a true description of one or more facts”).
48 Since  both  in  ethics  and  in  science  all  justification  cannot  be  but  argumentative
justification in the end, I take it only logical that Raccah decided to successfully become
one of the major philosophers of argumentation of our time.
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NOTES
1. He still holds this view to date (personal conversation 2014). See Raccah (2004) for an attempt
to develop the idea that the personality of an individual can be described by drawing a map of
the individual’s positive and negative commitments to ordinary points of view mainly consisting
in judgements of taste.
2. See Kant (1790). Also see, e.g., Zangwill (2013).
3. Since Hume set the problem, many philosophers have written in support or against his thesis.
For  a  recent  debate  concerning the possibility  to  violate  Hume’s  law,  see  e.g.  Karmo (1988),
Nelson (1995, 2007), Hill (2009).
4. By ‘the most robustly founded moral position’ I want here to refer to either the moral position
that turns out to be founded - in case only one moral position turns out to be founded - or, to the
moral position whose foundation appears to us as altogether most compelling - in case that more
than one moral position turns out to be founded.
5. From this point on, whenever I say “action” and “acting”, what I intend is “action or omission”
and “acting or omitting to act”.
6. He  uncompromisingly  expressed  this  position  in many  scientific  talks  and  other  public
occasions. On this point see also Raccah (2007). A corollary of this claim is the thesis that “no
human being can justify a reprehensible action arguing that they have been told or even ordered
to accomplish them. If a war criminal tries to do so, he or she will give the justified impression
that he or she is not behaving like a human being, but rather like a kind of animal or robot.”
(Raccah  2007:  1088).  The  latter  thesis  parallels  the  “anti-matter”  hypothesis  (“The  linguistic
effects of an utterance are not due to material causes”) and the “anti-magic” hypothesis (“The
linguistic effects of an utterance are not directly caused by them”) introduced in linguistics as
limitations to the general hypothesis that “utterances can cause behaviours” (ibidem).
7. E.g., under both the counterfactual and the actual sequence view: it is true that I could have
done otherwise if I had wanted to, and it is equally true that the course of events was at least
partially caused by a mental state of mine consisting in an intention to act as I actually acted.
8. Raccah (personal communication 2014).
9. Note: we need to be able to know that the effect is caused, among other factors, by our acting
as we act; and the act must be free; but it is not necessary that we are able to know that the effect
is caused, among other factors, by our freely acting as we act. We are morally responsible also if
we (even necessarily) falsely believe that we are not free in our acting, provided that we have
potential access to knowing that we, among other factors, cause the effect by acting as we act.
10. “Siempre queda la posibilidad de resistir a la tendencia a connectar el grafo” (Raccah 2004: 8).
11. Raccah (2005b).
12. By “descriptive argumentation” I mean any argumentation whose conclusion is a descriptive
proposition.  In particular any argumentation concluding that a certain scientific  theory or a
certain empirical statement is true, is a descriptive argumentation.
13. See also Raccah (2006: 3-4), Raccah (2008: 62) and Raccah (2010: 125) on this point.
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14. In such cases we may have no idea of what the new facts2 (the new “observable facts”) could
be like.  This is  why I  take these interpretations as prima facie not necessarily ending in the
construction of any kind of facts2.
15. See also, for example, Raccah (2011: 314): “Croire que la science n’est qu’idéologie est aussi
ennuyeux, stérile et dangereux que croire que la science est neutre.”
RÉSUMÉS
Cet article a pour objectif de mettre en évidence l’unité qui sous-tend les travaux de Pierre-Yves
Raccah relevant des champs divers tels que théorie de l’argumentation, éthique, épistémologies
générale  et  morale,  philosophie  des  sciences et  sciences  cognitives.  Dans  un premier  temps,
appuyé sur sa conception argumentative de la justification, je montrerai que son
antifondationnalisme  moral  est  une  conséquence  directe  de  la  prise  en  compte  de  la
reponsabilité en éthique et tout particulièrement de l’exigence relative à la méta-éthique : les
êtres humains sont totalement responsables de leurs positions morales aussi bien que des actions
exécutées  par rapport  à  ces  positions morales.  Dans un deuxième temps,  mes interrogations
seront portées à son anticonventionnalisme aussi bien qu’à ses considérations concernant les
métapréférences,  qui  sont  mis  en  œuvre  pour  pouvoir  maintenir  la  responsabilité  dans  le
domaine des prescriptions. Pour terminer, je mettrai en lumière que son épistémologie générale
est  fondée  sur  la  thèse  selon  laquelle  nous  sommes  moralement  responsables  des  théories
scientifiques  aussi  bien  que  des  constats  empiriques  acceptés  comme vrais,  la  responsabilité
étant pertinente dans le domaine des descriptions fondées sur l’empirisme.
This  paper  emphasises  that  there  is  a  deep unity  underlying  Pierre-Yves  Raccah’s  theory  of
argumentation,  ethics,  moral  epistemology,  general  epistemology,  philosophy  of  science  and
cognitive psychology. First I show that – on the background of his argumentative conception of
justifications  –  Raccah’s  moral  antifoundationalism  is  a  consequence  of  the  importance  he
assigns to responsibility in ethics, and in particular to the meta-ethical requirement that we are
fully responsible of the moral positions we hold and of the actions we perform in observance to
them. Then I explain why his anticonventionalism, as well as his account of how humans can
form higher-order effective metapreferences, play a very important role in achieving the target
of  safeguarding  our  full  responsibility  in  the  prescriptive  realm.  Finally,  I  argue  that  also
Raccah’s general epistemology is aimed at supporting the thesis that we are morally responsible
of both the scientific theories and the empirical statements we do accept as true. I show how
Raccah  can  assign  such  a  key  role  to  responsibility  also  in  the  descriptive  realm  without
abandoning empiricism.
INDEX
Mots-clés : argumentation, justification, fondationnalisme moral, conventionnalisme moral,
liberté, métareprésentation, faits, constats empiriques, observables, empirisme
Keywords : moral foundationalism, moral conventionalism, freedom, fact, empirical statement,
observable, experience.
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